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CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY AND INNOVATION: THE CASE OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Frederick L. Bereskin, University of Delaware and Po-Hsuan Hsu, University of Hong Kong* 
 
 
During the past few decades, pharmaceutical companies have launched corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) initiatives with the aim of strengthening their reputations, brand names, 
marketing, and public relations.1 And the corporate “investments” in such initiatives have been 
substantial. For example, a recent survey of seven big pharma firms reported that their median 
total giving in 2013 was $938 million.2 At the same time, competition in the industry has 
intensified due to accelerated manufacturing processes and increasing research and development 
(R&D) costs.3  
A number of business scholars have proposed that such CSR investments, besides 
burnishing corporate reputations, can be used to make more direct contributions to corporate 
competitiveness and value. In fact, in the Harvard Business Review, Michael Porter and Mark 
Kramer have gone so far as to suggest that “If… corporations were to analyze their prospects for 
social responsibility using the same frameworks that guide their core business choices, they 
would discover that CSR… can be much more than a cost, a constraint, or a charitable deed—it 
can be a source of opportunity, innovation, and competitive advantage.”  
                                                          
* This article draws on a paper by Frederick L. Bereskin, T.L. Campbell II, and P.H. Hsu, 2016, “Corporate 
Philanthropy, Research Networks, and Collaborative Innovation,” Financial Management 45(1), 175-206. Po-Hsuan 
Hsu acknowledges the grants from the General Research Fund (GRF) sponsored by the Research Grants Council in 
Hong Kong (HKU 790913 and 17500015). The authors also thank the research assistance of Yen-Yu Lin. 
1 See Hayley Droppert and Sara Bennett, 2015, “Corporate Social Responsibility in Global Health: An Exploratory 
Study of Multinational Pharmaceutical Firms,” Globalization and Health 11(15), 1-8. 
2 See Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, 2014, “Giving in Numbers,” Survey. 
3 See Victor E. Schwartz and Sanjay Unni, 2015, “A Brief Response to ‘Drug Design and Liability: Farewell to 
Comment k’: On the Intersection Between Patent Law and Tort Liability,” Baylor Law Review 67, 559-566. 
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Take the case of Merck.  In 2012, the company announced its creation of the California 
Institute for Biomedical Research—or “Calibr”—an independent non-profit organization whose 
mission is to “accelerate the translation of basic biomedical research into innovative, new 
medicines to treat disease.”4 Calibr’s scientists have been charged with turning basic research 
into new medicines that can be further developed through commercial partnerships. Merck has 
committed $90 million of funding to Calibr over a seven-year period, while retaining an 
exclusive commercial license for certain innovations. At the same time, Calibr—which is 
structured to run independently of Merck, and with an independent board of directors and 
scientific advisory board—has the right to seek licensing arrangements or other sources of 
funding for projects not licensed by Merck. 
 In addition to its ties to NGOs like Calibr, Merck also has extensive alliances with 
universities.  Greg Wiederrecht, Merck’s head of external scientific affairs, noted that 35% of its 
major licensing deals are with academic institutions, and that the firm executes approximately 50 
of those kinds of deals each year.  He also noted that in 2011 Merck implemented 277 
unannounced research collaborations, and that Merck’s annual interactions with academia 
number in the thousands.5 
But if many of Merck’s R&D collaborations have maintained a deliberately low profile, 
the company has received extensive public recognition of its philanthropic initiatives and 
investments.  For example, in 2014, the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy (CECP) 
presented Merck CEO Ken Frazier with its annual Founders Force for Good Award.  And in the 
same year, the Chronicle of Philanthropy ranked Merck third in its ranking of all U.S. corporate 
                                                          
4 See Merck & Co., 2012, “Merck Partners with Academic Scientists and Biotechnology Entrepreneurs to Create the 
California Institute for Biomedical Research (Calibr),” Press Release, March 15.  
5 See Chris Cain, 2012, “Merck’s reCalibration,” SciBX 5(12), 299. 
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donors—in fact, four of the top eight U.S. corporate givers were pharma companies, with Pfizer 
second, Johnson & Johnson sixth, and Eli Lilly eighth. In 2015, Corporate Responsibility 
Magazine ranked Merck 27th in its list of the 100 best corporate citizens. 
Other pharma companies have also developed collaborative relationships with academic 
and nonprofit institutions involving a variety of control or licensing rights.  Collaborations with 
research organizations such as universities and hospitals are likely to be particularly important 
for pharmaceutical firms. According to a recent study in the New England Journal of Medicine, 
during the period from 1990 to 2007, public-sector research institutions played some role in the 
discovery of as much as 20% of new-drug applications. What’s more, the drugs in which these 
institutions have played a role have tended to have greater efficacy.6 
There are a number of different ways in which pharma companies have collaborated with 
academia.7 One common model is the establishment of large research institutions or commitment 
to fund current institutions.  For example, in 2012, Novartis and University of Pennsylvania 
announced a collaborative venture—the Center for Advanced Cellular Therapeutics (CACT)—
funded in part by a $20 million grant from Novartis, and where Novartis will be granted 
exclusive licensing rights and University of Pennsylvania will receive royalty payments.8 
Similarly, in 2011 Gilead Sciences pledged $100 million over the next ten years to the Yale 
School of Medicine, thereby making the “largest corporate commitment to Yale in the 
                                                          
6 See A.J. Stevens, J.J. Jensen, K. Wyller, P.C. Kilgore, S. Chatterjee, and M.L. Rohrbaugh, 2011, “The Role of 
Public-Sector Research in the Discovery of Drugs and Vaccines,” New England Journal of Medicine 364(6), 535-
541. 
7 See Christopher-Paul Milne and Ashley Malins, 2012, “Academic-Industry Partnerships for Biopharmaceutical 
Research & Development: Advancing Medical Science in the U.S.,” Working paper, Tufts University School of 
Medicine, for a discussion of different models between academic medical colleges and industry.  
8 See University of Pennsylvania, 2016, “Novartis-Penn Center for Advanced Cellular Therapeutics Unveiled at 
Penn Medicine,” Press release, February 16. 
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university’s history.”9  Gilead will have the first right to license the collaboration’s intellectual 
property, and academics will be allowed to publish the research done as part of the collaboration. 
In 2008, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) and the Harvard Stem Cell Institute (HSCI) announced a five-
year, $25 million agreement.  As part of this agreement, GSK has been funding research at HSCI 
and other hospitals affiliated with Harvard Medical School, while also supporting research grants 
and staff exchange programs.  This joint venture is expected to create property rights that will be 
shared by the two parties.10  
A somewhat different way of collaborating with outside talent is a so-called “contest” 
model, as exemplified by GlaxoSmithKline’s “Discovery Fast Track” competition.  In this 
program, which was started in 2013, the firm selects proposals from academic researchers, in 
which the winning proposals receive funding and GSK receives licensing rights.  The 2015 
competition resulted in six winning proposals from 378 entries.11  Eli Lilly’s Open Innovation 
Drug Discovery program is another example. That program allows scientists at different research 
institutions to develop and evaluate drug candidates with resources provided by Lilly.  In 
exchange, the company has first rights to a licensing or collaboration agreement. 
In other cases, the relationship with academic scientists is more explicit in its aim of 
providing commercially successful products for the supporting pharmaceutical firm.  In one such 
example, Sanofi and the University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) are collaborating on 
diabetes research and other areas.12  Similarly, Pfizer’s Centers for Therapeutic Innovation (CTI) 
have been established in a number of locations (known as “bioclusters”) to capitalize on 
                                                          
9 See Yale School of Medicine, 2011, “A Major Boost for Cancer Drug Discovery,” Press Release, May 13. 
10 See Victor Alamo-Bethencourt, 2008, “GSK’s Harvard Cash Injection,” Nature Biotechnology 26(9), 956. 
11 See GlaxoSmithKline, 2016, “GSK Names Winners of 2015 Discovery Fast Track Challenge,” Press release, 
March 4. 
12 See University of California San Francisco, 2012, “UCSF, Sanofi Collaborate to Find New Diabetes Cures,” Press 
Release, January 10. 
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collaborations between Pfizer scientists, academic institutions, and disease foundations. Through 
its CTIs, Pfizer provides its expertise to validate potential drug candidates.13 
The arrangements described above are presented as examples of how pharmaceutical 
companies’ CSR initiatives can become important aspects of their strategies for innovation. 
Industry contributions to academic institutions and other research partners range from 
unrestricted gifts to fee-for-service, while including joint ventures and other types of 
collaborations.  But for all their differences, each of these forms of philanthropy can be seen as 
investments in the corporate future, part of the quest for competitive advantage in innovation.  
 
Background on Corporate Philanthropy 
As practiced by U.S. companies, corporate philanthropy is generally done in one of two 
main ways: (1) direct contributions to NGOs for activities or purposes that are typically specified 
by the corporate donors; or (2) donations to corporate-sponsored foundations, which then 
oversee the funds.  And corporate philanthropy in the U.S. involves significant amounts.  In 
2014, for example, the median Fortune 100 company made $54 million in charitable donations, 
representing 0.8% of pre-tax profit—and charitable giving by Fortune 100 health care companies 
was even higher, at 1.2% of pre-tax profit.14 
But despite the prominence of corporate charitable foundations, most charitable giving in 
fact occurs through direct contributions.15 And as discussed in the pages that follow, the findings 
of our recent study of donations by 18 U.S. pharma companies show clear differences in the 
                                                          
13 See http://www.pfizer.com/research/rd_partnering/centers_for_therapeutic_innovation. 
14 See Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy, 2015, “Giving in Numbers,” Survey. 
15 See GivingUSA Foundation, 2015, “The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014,” Annual Report. 
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payoffs to companies that choose direct contributions rather than “delegated giving” through 
sponsored foundations.16 
 Charitable giving through corporate-sponsored foundations requires public disclosure of 
the recipients and the dollar amounts donated to each—amounts that are also reported on IRS 
form PPF 990.  Disclosure of direct contributions, however, is completely voluntary.17  What’s 
more, companies have tended to resist mandatory disclosure of their direct giving activities, 
which may seem surprising given the positive news associated with most charitable giving.18 But 
given our finding that much of pharma companies’ direct charitable contributions are driven by 
their innovation strategies, the companies’ reluctance to disclose can be attributed to their desire 
to protect competitive secrets.19 
Conducting and funding research-related activities in the form of philanthropic programs 
has a number of advantages over conventional in-house R&D.  First, from the perspective of an 
NGO that may otherwise be reluctant to develop a collaborative relationship with a for-profit 
firm, the partnership can be more readily justified under the auspices of philanthropic support.20 
                                                          
16 In a related paper that we wrote with another coauthor, we examine the effects of corporate philanthropy on 
innovation, and show that the effect holds among a broader collection of U.S. firms (see Fred L. Bereskin, T.L. 
Campbell II, and P.H. Hsu, 2016, “Corporate Philanthropy, Research Networks, and Collaborative Innovation,” 
Financial Management 45(1), 175-206. 
17 See GivingUSA Foundation, 2015, “The Annual Report on Philanthropy for the Year 2014,” Annual Report.  
18 For example, when Senator Mike Oxley and Representative Paul Gillmor attempted to require mandatory 
disclosure of firms’ charitable giving in 1997, firms’ comment letters were generally against the proposed 
legislation, often referring to the joint role of philanthropy and corporate strategy. Adolph Coors Company’s 
comment letter, for example, suggested that the mandatory disclosure, “would have a devastating impact on these 
marketing and sales strategies, and the very worthy charitable endeavors they fund” (see 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/s72697/smith1.htm).  
19 For additional discussions of how philanthropic programs could be used to outsource R&D, see Usha Haley, 
1991, “Corporate Contributions as Managerial Masques: Reframing Corporate Contributions as Strategies to 
Influence Society,” Journal of Management Studies 28(5), 485-509; N.C. Smith, 1994, “The New Corporate 
Philanthropy,” Harvard Business Review 72, 105-116; F. Kahn, 1997, “Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and 
the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy,” UCLA Law Review 44, 579-676; Baruch Lev, C. Petrovits, and S. 
Radhakrishnan, 2010, “Is Doing Good Good for You? How Corporate Charitable Contributions Enhance Revenue 
Growth,” Strategic Management Journal 31, 182-200. 
20 See Michael Porter and M. Kramer, 2002, “The Competitive Advantage of Corporate Philanthropy. The Link 
Between Competitive Advantage and Corporate Social Responsibility,” Harvard Business Review December, 5-16. 
 
 
7 
 
Second, the research orientation of the NGO, and the nature of its partnership with the pharma 
firm, provides stronger assurance that such projects won’t be shortchanged or shut down as a 
result of myopic cutbacks to corporate R&D by the firm—a possibility that seems especially 
large for low-return or “non-core” projects because they are outside of the typical scope of 
conventional R&D-related activities.  Finally, since the expenditure is partly justified as being 
associated with developing a relationship with a research organization—and given the possibly 
longer-term research focus of the research organization—projects are likely to experience fewer 
organizational hurdles. 
In addition to the benefits of direct giving compared to conventional in-house R&D, it is 
important to consider the benefits of giving directly as opposed to through corporate-sponsored 
foundations.  First, as already noted, outlays from foundations are publicly disclosed. Second, the 
fiduciary duty of the foundations’ directors’ are to the foundation, even though they are 
appointed by the sponsoring company. Third, foundations have restrictions on the kinds of 
investments they can pursue, including restrictions on venture capital.  
As discussed below, our findings provide a new perspective on the private value of 
philanthropy—one that provides more support for the proposition that companies can “do good” 
by and while “doing well” for their shareholders. Indeed, our findings can be seen as persuasive 
evidence that many activities that take the form of philanthropic giving are also designed to 
increase corporate sustainability and long-run values through effective collaboration with outside 
research organizations.  
  
Our Study  
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Previous researchers have recognized that corporate giving provides benefits for the 
firm’s investors, as well as its other important stakeholders. For example, studies have provided 
evidence that CSR increases the attractiveness of the firm to current and prospective employees, 
which in turn is associated with more innovative companies.21 Corporate philanthropy also 
serves as a type of insurance against certain kinds of shareholder activists—though typically 
those intent not on maximizing overall value, but in strengthening the claims of non-investor 
stakeholders.22 Finally, philanthropy has also been shown to function as a kind of advertising and 
brand building, one that is associated with higher product prices, both of which are relevant to 
new innovations.23  
For the purpose of our study, however, the limitation of the existing research and 
explanations is that they all predict uniformly positive effects on corporate innovation and values 
by charitable contributions, regardless of whether they are made directly to NGOs that conduct 
research or administered through corporate-sponsored foundations. But, as previously noted and 
discussed in more detail below, the main finding of our recent study is the notable contrast 
between pharma companies’ two different choices of funding (direct charitable contributions 
versus their charitable foundations), and the resulting quantity and quality of associated 
innovations.  
                                                          
21 See Daniel Turban and Daniel Greening, 1997, “Corporate Social Performance and Organizational Attractiveness 
to Prospective Employees,” Academy of Management Journal 40(3), 658-67; James Werbel and Max Wortman Jr., 
2000, “Strategic Philanthropy: Responding to Negative Portrayals of Corporate Social Responsibility,” Corporate 
Reputation Review 3(2), 124-136; and Dane Peterson, 2004, “The Relationship Between Perceptions of Corporate 
Citizenship and Organizational Commitment,” Business & Society 43(3), 296-319. 
22 See David Baron, 2001, “Private Politics, Corporate Social Responsibility, and Integrated Strategy,” Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 10(1), 7-45; and Giavanni Cespa and Giacinta Cestone, 2007, “Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment,” Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 16(3), 741-771. 
23 See Robert Schwartz, 1968, “Corporate Philanthropic Contributions,” Journal of Finance 23(3), 479-4976) for the 
advertising effects of philanthropy and Piet Eichholtz, Nils Kok, and John Quigley, 2013, “The Economics of Green 
Building,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 95(1), 50-63, for studies linking CSR to higher product prices. 
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Data 
In conducting our study, we began by gathering data on corporate philanthropy, patents, 
and drug approvals for a large sample of U.S. pharma companies during the period 1989 through 
2004. 24 
The two main measures we used for corporate innovative output are patent counts and 
patent citations. Patent count is the number of successful patent applications filed by a company 
in a sample year. Patent citation is the number of forward citations received by the firm in the 
sample year from all successful patent applications that occur in that year. Our measure of patent 
citations excludes self-citations and also controls for the “vintage bias” that results from older 
patents tending to receive more citations than newer patents. 
The patent data also enabled us to study the effectiveness of what might be viewed as 
corporate investments in innovation. More specifically, we estimated variables intended to 
reflect “patent influence” and “patent productivity.” Patent influence was measured by the “log-
linearized” citations per patent, and patent productivity by the log-linearized patent count in the 
                                                          
24 The Taft Group’s Corporate Giving Directory includes firms giving at least $200,000 annually, either through 
direct charitable contributions or through charitable foundations. The Foundation Center provided us with a list of 
corporate foundations that were created in 1999 and later that were not in the sample from the Taft Group. The 
National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) provided us with an updated sample of firms’ foundation outlays 
(collected from foundations’ 990-PF filings with the IRS). The direct giving data is supplemented and updated with 
a sample from The Chronicle of Philanthropy. Their data comes from annual surveys completed by the 300 largest 
firms in the Fortune 500. In the Chronicle’s most recent survey provided to us, one hundred seventeen of their 
sample firms’ completed their survey. We thank Christine Petrovits for providing us with her sample, which she 
used in “Corporate-Sponsored Foundations and Earnings Management,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 41, 
335-362, 2006. Our patent data came from the NBER patent database that consists of detailed information such as 
data on patent inventors, assignees (such as firms), technological categories, citations received by each patent from 
other filings, filing dates, and issue dates. The original data set is discussed in Hall et al. (2005a) and is posted at 
http://www.nber.org/patents/. Updated versions of the data set are provided at 
https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home/downloads.  
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following year divided by R&D spending. (Both measures have been widely used in the 
innovation literature for evaluating corporate R&D activities.25) 
We used four variables to try to capture the scope of companies’ innovations. The first 
was “patent originality,” which reflects the breadth of knowledge used for firms’ patents. Patents 
that have cited a broad range of previous patents are regarded as more “original” since they rely 
on relatively broad research.26 Our second variable was “patent generality,” which is a measure 
of the diversity of the technologies that cite that patent.27 Our third and fourth variables were 
“explorative patent counts” and the “exploration ratio.” Corporate patenting activity can provide 
a measure of the breadth of a company’s knowledge base. Specifically, we defined a patent as 
“explorative” if more than 60% of its citations are based on “new knowledge”—that is, on the set 
of patents cited by the firm over the previous five years or patents owned by the firm. The 
explorative patent ratio is the count of explorative patents divided by the total patent count in the 
focal year.28 
To control for corporate size, our patent measures were scaled by the firm’s sales.29 
Additionally, our patent measures were constructed by application year for all patents that are 
applied for that are subsequently approved. 30  
                                                          
25 See Jean Lanjouw and Mark Schankerman , 2004, “Patent Quality and Research Productivity: Measuring 
Innovation with Multiple Indicators,” Economic Journal 114, 441-465. 
26 Using the technology class of all patents cited by the focal patent, patent originality is calculated as one minus the 
Herfindahl index of those patents’ technology class. 
27 Specifically, the measure is calculated as one minus the Herfindahl index based on the technology class 
distribution of the patents that cite the focal patent. 
28 For a more thorough discussion of originality and generality, see Manuel Trajtenberg, Rebecca Henderson, and 
Adam Jaffe, 1997, “University versus Corporate Patents: A Window on the Basicness of Invention,” Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology 5(1), 19-50. 
29 See Frederic M. Scherer, 1965, “Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and the Output of Patented 
Inventions,” American Economic Review 55(5), 1097-1125; and Baruch Lev and Theodore Sougiannis, 1996, “The 
Capitalization, Amortization, and Value-Relevance of R&D,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 21, 107-138.  
30 We drop the final two years of patent data from our sample (2005 and 2006) since it typically takes an average of 
two to three years for a patent application to be subsequently approved. See Bronwyn Hall, Adam B. Jaffe, and 
Manuel Trajtenberg, 2005b, “Market Value and Patent Citations,” RAND Journal of Economics 36(1), 16-38. 
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Our fifth and final measure of innovation was the number of drug approvals a company 
received from the FDA. We retrieve all drug approval records from FDA online database 
(Drugs@fda) for our sample period. We then manually match the drug manufacturers to public 
firms listed in the U.S. through their names, locations, and other web sources. 
 
Results 
Our main finding is that direct giving is positively associated with patent output. More 
specifically, as reported in Panel A of Table 1, for our sample of companies, each one standard 
deviation increase in direct giving is associated with a 28% increase in the number of patents and 
a 46% increase in patent citations. We also find that the patent influence (as measured by 
citations per patent) increases by 18% for a one standard deviation increase in direct giving, and 
patent productivity (patent count divided by R&D expenditure) is 9% higher. Moreover, the 
other explanatory variables also have the expected effects; for example, R&D spending is 
positively associated with subsequent counts and citations, while advertising expense is 
positively, but insignificantly, associated with these values.31  
In contrast to these findings, we also find, as reported in Panel B, that corporate donations 
to (and giving by) their own foundations are not significantly associated with either their patent 
output (as measured, again, by Counts and Cites) or the performance of their patent investments 
(as measured by Influence and Productivity). Our evidence in Panel B is particularly interesting 
when considering the previous research that points to positive effects associated with charitable 
giving generally—that is, from direct contributions as well as corporate-sponsored foundations. 
                                                          
31 We control for advertising due to firms’ philanthropy partially being driven by reputation and advertising motives. 
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Specifically, as we note earlier in our paper, foundation giving provides benefits to the firm in 
more easily attracting and retaining highly qualified employees and being more protected from 
being targeted by outside (albeit not generally value-maximizing) activists. Additionally, the 
results in Panel B are consistent with our results from Panel A in not being driven by an omitted 
variable, since if both innovation and corporate philanthropy are associated with a factor such as 
better business opportunities or financial resources, we would expect to see the relation for 
contributions regardless of whether they are made directly by the firm or by its foundation. 
(Insert Table 1 around here) 
In the second stage of our study, we examined the “mechanism” by which corporate 
philanthropic contributions are associated with their innovative output. Specifically, when we 
looked more carefully at measures of patent breadth, we found that direct giving is associated 
with obtaining patents that have the potential to expand the companies’ expertise and range of 
investment opportunities. What’s more, when we examined the increases in patent breadth 
measures over two different time horizons—in the following year’s breadth-increasing activities 
(as reported in Panel A), and in the following three-year period (Panel B)—the longer-term 
measures tended to have even greater statistical significance, consistent with the benefits of a 
broader base of knowledge manifesting over a somewhat longer time-period.  
As reflected in the estimates reported in Panel B, we find that patent originality and 
generality increases by 34% and 20%, respectively, for each one standard deviation increase in 
direct giving, demonstrating the considerable breadth and broad application of these firms’ 
patents. Moreover, using our two measures for explorative innovations (which reflect the 
changes in the firms’ areas of expertise) we provide additional evidence that direct giving is 
associated with an expanded knowledge base. In particular, we show that the number of 
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explorative patents (that is, patents outside of the firm’s existing knowledge base) increases by 
46.0%, and that the proportion of explorative patents increases by 38.5%.  
(Insert Table 2 around here) 
Finally, we show that direct giving is positively associated with the number of FDA drug 
approvals. As reported in Table 3, when we performed a Poisson regression of the number of 
FDA drug approvals on the amount of direct giving, we found that each one standard deviation 
increase in direct giving was associated with a 19.6% increase in the number of drug approvals 
in the following five-year period. At the same time, we find that giving by the companies’ 
charitable foundations does not have a significant effect on FDA drug approvals. 
This difference further confirms our earlier findings based on patent-based measures, and 
suggests that direct giving leads to more new drugs that are critical performance indicators for 
pharma firms. At the same time, we find no evidence that the foundation-funded philanthropy 
that is said to improve corporate reputation has any effect on the regulatory process and the 
likelihood of FDA approval. 
(Insert Table 3 around here) 
Conclusion 
Our study shows that direct contributions by large pharmaceutical companies have been 
used with considerable success to facilitate relationships with academia and thereby increase 
their innovative capabilities and output. By contrast, philanthropic donations by big pharma to 
the companies’ sponsored foundations have had relatively little to show for them.  
More specifically, our findings show that direct giving is associated with a greater 
quantity and quality of innovations, patents that are more influential, and R&D spending that is 
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more productive. What’s more, when we use the patent data to show possible changes in the 
breadth of corporate R&D, we provide evidence that direct giving is associated with patents with 
potential to broaden the scope of the firm beyond its traditional expertise and technological class. 
And as one final, and commercially important, manifestation of this effect, we show that 
companies with more direct giving have greater success in obtaining FDA drug approvals. 
All in all, then, our findings show that corporate giving decisions by big pharma have 
played a significant role in their strategy for innovation, and in the success of that strategy. Our 
study also suggests that the effect is driven by direct giving to institutions, and not by funding 
through corporate-sponsored foundations. 
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Table 1: Corporate Philanthropy and Innovation 
This table examines the effects of corporate philanthropy (direct giving and foundation giving) on innovation. The dependent variables are: Counts (the number of patent applications in the subsequent 
year that are eventually approved, scaled by sales), Cites (the number of non-self forward patent citations in the following year for patents that are subsequently approved, scaled by sales), Influence (the 
logged ratio of Cites to Counts), and Productivity (the logged ration of Counts to R&D expense). The independent variables are: DirectGiving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm scaled by 
sales and multiplied by 1,000), FoundationGiving (the level of giving by corporate sponsored foundations scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), RD (Research & Development expenditure scaled by 
sales), Advertising (advertising expenditure scaled by sales), MarketToBook (the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets), Leverage (using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue 
(the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the percentage of institutional ownership). We include year fixed-effects. Panel A presents the results with direct giving, and Panel B presents the results with corporate-
sponsored foundations. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 Panel A: Direct giving Panel B: Foundation giving 
 Counts Cites Influence Productivity Counts Cites Influence Productivity 
                  
DirectGiving 0.002*** 0.031*** 0.483*** 0.079***     
 (3.168) (5.542) (3.663) (3.999)     
FoundationGiving     -0.004 -0.010 0.007 -0.232 
     (-0.761) (-0.149) (0.031) (-0.656) 
RD 0.129* 1.052* -5.385 -1.477 0.142** 1.218* 0.484 -0.891 
 (2.010) (1.751) (-1.312) (-0.978) (2.357) (2.026) (0.543) (-0.692) 
Advertising 0.025 -0.639 -15.024 1.965 0.011 -0.835 -1.149 1.386 
 (0.530) (-1.527) (-1.357) (0.630) (0.224) (-1.490) (-0.541) (0.413) 
MarketToBook 0.000 -0.001 -0.327 0.144 0.001 0.002 -0.028 0.149 
 (0.323) (-0.077) (-0.862) (1.071) (0.385) (0.167) (-0.338) (1.041) 
Leverage 0.047 0.652* 1.100 6.426*** 0.061 0.889** 1.374 7.016*** 
 (0.946) (1.752) (0.131) (3.234) (1.527) (2.601) (1.041) (4.145) 
LogRevenue -0.004 -0.002 0.087 -0.143 -0.002 0.030 0.216** -0.062 
 (-1.587) (-0.075) (0.133) (-1.214) (-1.012) (1.295) (2.349) (-0.524) 
InstiOwn -0.019* -0.041 4.048 -0.495 -0.015 0.003 0.869** -0.288 
 (-1.821) (-0.365) (1.675) (-0.900) (-1.406) (0.028) (2.300) (-0.538) 
Constant 0.037 0.016 7.097 -2.028 0.021 -0.266 -0.818 -2.644* 
 (1.135) (0.064) (1.240) (-1.553) (0.847) (-1.085) (-0.967) (-2.081) 
         
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
R-squared 48.8% 55.4% 58.1% 37.0% 46.7% 47.6% 68.0% 35.9% 
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Table 2: Exploration-related Measures of Innovation 
This table examines the effects of corporate philanthropy (direct giving) on innovation. The dependent variables are: Originality, Generality, Exploration, and Exploration Rate. Originality is defined as 
one minus the Herfindahl index based on the technology class of all patents that have been cited by the firm’s patents, Generality is defined as one minus the Herfindahl index based on the technology 
class of all patents that cite the firm’s patents, Exploration is our measure of explorative innovations based on the number of patents for which at least 60% of the citations are outside of the firm’s existing 
knowledge base as defined in Benner and Tushman (2002), and Exploration Rate is the corresponding value based on the ratio of explorative patents filed during the year. The independent variables are: 
DirectGiving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), RD (Research & Development expenditure scaled by sales), Advertising (advertising expenditure 
scaled by sales), MarketToBook (the market value of assets divided by the book value of assets), Leverage (using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue (the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the percentage 
of institutional ownership). We include year fixed-effects. Panel A presents the results over a one-year period, and Panel B presents the results over the cumulative three-year period. T-statistics based on 
robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 Panel A: Innovation in following year 
Panel B: Cumulative innovation in following  
three-year period 
 Originality Generality Exploration 
Exploration 
Rate Originality Generality Exploration 
Exploration 
Rate 
                  
DirectGiving 0.005*** 0.002 0.001** 0.037 0.016*** 0.006* 0.003** 0.134* 
 (4.485) (1.726) (2.802) (1.723) (4.042) (1.747) (2.696) (2.031) 
RD 0.184* 0.281* 0.036** 0.551 0.675* 0.837* 0.114* 1.679 
 (1.989) (1.816) (2.122) (0.958) (2.045) (1.809) (2.102) (0.964) 
Advertising 0.033 0.038 0.002 -0.037 0.083 0.073 -0.002 -1.364 
 (0.390) (0.571) (0.121) (-0.029) (0.291) (0.344) (-0.042) (-0.396) 
MarketToBook -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.014 -0.003 -0.000 -0.001 -0.106 
 (-0.372) (-0.309) (-0.532) (-0.499) (-0.374) (-0.010) (-0.629) (-1.440) 
Leverage 0.156 0.115 0.001 0.187 0.402 0.279 0.005 -0.786 
 (1.557) (1.435) (0.043) (0.245) (1.197) (1.053) (0.108) (-0.319) 
LogRevenue -0.012* -0.003 -0.003** -0.115** -0.038** -0.006 -0.007** -0.288* 
 (-2.097) (-0.596) (-2.360) (-2.244) (-2.114) (-0.443) (-2.305) (-1.792) 
InstiOwn -0.029 -0.030 -0.005 -0.368* -0.080 -0.075 -0.010 -1.115** 
 (-1.115) (-1.441) (-1.007) (-1.972) (-1.038) (-1.228) (-0.749) (-2.172) 
Constant 0.122* 0.018 0.026* 0.925* 0.366* 0.024 0.062* 2.830 
 (1.802) (0.301) (1.869) (1.746) (1.750) (0.126) (1.779) (1.650) 
          
Observations 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 163 
R-squared 39.9% 50.0% 54.5% 40.0% 49.9% 55.4% 57.6% 51.7% 
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Table 3: Effect on Drug Approvals 
This table provides Poisson results of the effects of corporate philanthropy on drug approvals. The dependent variable is the number of drug 
approvals in the following five years. The independent variables are: DirectGiving (the disclosed level of direct giving by the firm scaled by sales 
and multiplied by 1,000), FoundationGiving (the level of giving by corporate sponsored foundations scaled by sales and multiplied by 1,000), RD 
(Research & Development expenditure scaled by sales), Advertising (advertising expenditure scaled by sales), MarketToBook (the market value 
of assets divided by the book value of assets), Leverage (using the market value of the firm), LogRevenue (the log of sales), and InstiOwn (the 
percentage of institutional ownership). We include year fixed-effects. T-statistics based on robust firm-clustered standard errors are provided in 
parentheses below the coefficient value. *, **, and *** denote significant differences from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively. 
 
DirectGiving 0.062**  
 (2.064)  
FoundationGiving  0.245 
  (1.100) 
RD -0.054 0.281 
 (-0.025) (0.112) 
Advertising -2.962 -3.134 
 (-0.671) (-0.799) 
MarketToBook 0.056 0.066 
 (0.630) (0.761) 
Leverage 6.229* 7.065* 
 (1.688) (1.793) 
LogRevenue 0.438 0.543* 
 (1.637) (1.806) 
InstiOwn 0.329 0.384 
 (0.374) (0.434) 
Constant -0.022 -1.337 
 (-0.008) (-0.400) 
   
Observations 163 163 
Pseudo R-squared 27.0% 25.9% 
 
 
